



## **TRENDS!**

### Ukrainian soldiers are turning consumer drones into formidable weapons of war



Simple photography drones are being put to good use on the battlefield in Ukraine to surveil Russian troops and find the best point of attack.




### M109A3 hit by russian loitering munition



#Ukraine: A Ukrainian M109A3 SPG was hit by a what is claimed to be a Russian ZALA Lancet loitering munition somewhere in the East.



### Russians have begun training on Iranian drones, US believes



The US believes Russian officials have begun training on drones in Iran over the last several weeks, the latest sign that Russia intends to purchase the systems as the war in Ukraine continues.





## **MUST READ! - UKRAINE-Special**

# Russia's War in Ukraine Series No. 9 - Russia's Propaganda War

WHEN RUSSIA WENT TO WAR  
TRENDS IN THE UKRAINE  
SERIES NO. 9

RONALD MITKA

On 24 February 2022, Russia went to war in Ukraine. The month following has continued military Russia's attack strategy. This document examines the current conflict in Ukraine and the previous wars, with a particular emphasis on the events in 2008 and in 2014, and April in 2022. Russia's operations came in response to "escalating" situations and perceived "disruptions" in Russia's national interests. The current war in Ukraine, Russia's decision to go to war was not provoked by recent changes in its neighborhood or by any conceivable near-term military threat. Moscow alone instigated hostilities and chose the time and place at which it would attack its neighbor. Russia's attack on Ukraine that resembles more the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary in 1956 or the Warsaw Pact's attack on Czechoslovakia in 1968 than it does Russia's attacks on Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014.

### EARLY INDICATORS

The long phase of Russia's preparation to attack Ukraine should almost have been the subject of headlines. In March 2021, the Russian Armed Forces began the largest deployment exercise in their history. Their combined force of the 472 Combined Arms Army (CAA) was deployed from Siberia to training areas in Pskov, south of Voronezh, Simferopol, near Novosibirsk in Crimea. Russian units established an equipment storage area for units belonging to the 10<sup>th</sup> CAA, organized from the eastern Caucuses. At the time, the goal of this exercise was to test the readiness of the units to carry out operations, although Ukraine may have been a potential mission target due to its perceived plans to invade the Donbas.

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This brief will assess Russia's preparations for war in part through the prism of an analysis published in 2020, which included a list of indicators of possible Russian intent to conduct large-scale operations against its neighbors. However, it should be noted that this was merely a list of indicators and not a list of indicators. Although some markers still applied, Russia went to war against Ukraine with a different posture than it would adopt if it were to attack NATO.

Igor Gretskiy, a Research Fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the ICDS, examines key elements of Russia's propaganda and disinformation that were crucial in the years long preparation of the invasion of Ukraine.



# Modern Resistance – Learning From Non-Western Examples

Research Article

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**Abstract:** Due to Russia's continuous malicious actions against the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, as well as its ongoing war against Ukraine, most European countries have recently been forced to take a critical look at their national defense strategies and military capabilities. This review uncovers serious capability gaps, resulting in the emergence of so-called total defense strategies based on peacetime social resilience and war time resistance. This article focuses on resistance, arguing that the current manifestations of such a strategy do not ensure maximum results for the countries because their fundamental characteristics and principles were derived from cases that are limited in spatial and temporal scope. The article suggests that lessons must be also learned from recent experiences such as the Chechen resistance against Russia, Hezbollah's fight against Israel, the Iraq and Taliban insurgencies, the Syrian insurgency, and other similar cases. This article offers a starting point for identifying such critical lessons by analyzing the First Russo-Chechen War through a research model built on the common principles of Mao Zedong, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, and General Vo Nguyen Giap.

**Keywords:** Russia, strategy, resistance, irregular warfare

Due to Russia's continuous malicious actions against the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, as well as its ongoing war against Ukraine, most European countries have recently been forced to take a critical look at their national defense strategies and military capabilities.



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