

TRENDS!


Top U.S. Special Ops General On Drone Threat



The drone threat is rapidly growing and targeting supply chains and crafting new international norms could be just as important as shooting them down.



Drone Strike On Black Sea Fleet Headquarters Likely A Sign Of What's To Come



Despite Ukrainian denials from some quarters, officials in Moscow say that the drone strike was launched from within Russia-held territory.



Ukraine: Krieg der Drohnen



Sie spähnen feindliche Stellungen aus und werfen Bomben ab. Im Ukrainekrieg gehören Drohnen zu den wichtigsten Waffen der Militärs.





MUST READ! - UKRAINE-Special

Russia's War in Ukraine Series No. 7 - When Russia Went to War

WHEN RUSSIA WENT TO WAR
THOMAS WOODS IN UKRAINE
SERIES NO. 7

RICHARD WITZ

On 24 February 2022, Russia went to war in Ukraine. The world knows it has committed itself to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2008. Although there are many differences between the current conflict and the previous wars, one distinction particularly stands out: in 2008, and in Ukraine and Syria in 2014, Moscow's operations came in response to a developing situation and perceived provocations. In Russia's national interest, the current war in Ukraine is a decision to go to war was not provoked by recent changes in its neighborhood or by any conceivable near-term military threat. Moscow alone instigated hostilities and chose the time and place at which it would attack its neighbor. Russia's attack on Ukraine that resembles more the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary in 1956 or the Warsaw Pact's attack on Czechoslovakia in 1968 than it does Russia's attacks on Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014.

EARLY INDICATORS
The brief will assess Russia's preparations for war in general through the prism of an analysis published in the article in 2020, which included a list of indicators of possible Russian intent to conduct large-scale combat operations against Ukraine and its Western partners, Russia's harmful activities regarding Ukraine's nuclear power plants, and Russia's false accusations against Ukraine and its Western partners concerning chemical and biological weapons and laboratories. Many Russian actions – such as attacking civilian nuclear power plants or employing hypersonic missiles – have not precedents with potentially irreparable future consequences.

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ANY LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS OF RUSSIA WILL BE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY

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The seventh brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns Russia’s military and political preparations for attacking Ukraine through the prism of indicators of possible intent to conduct large-scale combat operations.



Russia's War in Ukraine Series No. 8 - WMD Issues

WMD ISSUES
RICHARD WITZ IN UKRAINE
SERIES NO. 8

RICHARD WITZ

This brief provides a comprehensive, if necessarily preliminary, review of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issues that have arisen since 24 February 2022. These issues include Russian threats to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine and its Western partners, Russia's employment of hypersonic missiles, Russia's harmful activities regarding Ukraine's nuclear power plants, and Russia's false accusations against Ukraine and its Western partners concerning chemical and biological weapons and laboratories. Many Russian actions – such as attacking civilian nuclear power plants or employing hypersonic missiles – have not precedents with potentially irreparable future consequences.

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The frequency of Russian nuclear threats has generally declined during the war. A possible reason is that Western governments have made clear their reluctance to intervene directly with their own combat forces. Instead, they have limited their response to imposing economic sanctions on Russia while rendering military training, weapon delivery, and diplomatic backing to Ukraine. On 25 June, Putin announced that Russia would test uranium bombs, and train Belarus to operate them, and Russia intends to provide that country with laboratory facilities, which can deliver nuclear as well as conventional warheads.” Putin’s statement follows the removal earlier this year of a nuclear reactor component from the country’s “nuclear fleet” status.

ANY LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS OF RUSSIA WILL BE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY

In the eighth brief of our “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series, Hudson Institute’s Richard Weitz examines issues related to weapons of mass destruction.

