

TRENDS!

Vision For Future Manned-Unmanned Air Combat



Multi-layered "distributed team" of diverse unmanned aircraft working in concert with manned types, presents a far more capable alternative to so-called 'loyal wingman' concepts.



Laser Air Defense Weapons To Equip Army This Year



Why Raytheon believes their high-energy laser weapons systems are now mature enough to transition from the science and technology world to regular battlefield use.




BAE robot strikes target with APKWS laser-guided rocket



BAE Systems' Robotic Technology Demonstrator successfully fired laser-guided rockets at multiple ground targets, with a human decision in the loop.





MUST READ! - UKRAINE-Special

Russia's War in Ukraine Series No. 5 - The Early Air War

The fifth brief of the series looks at the early air war. Russia's failure to conduct a devastating air offensive and secure air superiority, despite having all the advantages on paper at the start of its war in Ukraine, was a great surprise to observers and had major strategic impact.



RUSSIAN MILITARY LOGISTICS

RUSSIAN MILITARY LOGISTICS SERIES NO. 5

The size, scale, and scope of the military failures Russia has suffered during its war in Ukraine have surprised many Western observers. Russia's military has experienced multiple systemic deficiencies in its military, which appear to be indicative and to extend across every Russian joint combat function. A leading cause of its operational failures has been the critical deficiencies apparent in Russia's military logistic support. The inadequacy of Russia's military logistic system has consequently been a major

(Romanov 1)

factor in its inability to achieve its war aims. This brief will provide a summary of the key factors behind Russia's logistic failures to date – and present some immediate lessons for the Baltic states. The main message is that the degradation (and thus the solution) for Russia's military logistic failure in Ukraine is not complex. It is, rather, the result of complex interactions between a diverse set of organisational, command, doctrinal, cultural, and historical factors.

Russian commanders have also shown an alarming lack of tactical acumen in their neglect of protection for logistic convoys, as well as the "strategic" of logistic convoys (often on unimproved, soft-skinned, logistic vehicles). This situation appears to have been greatly exacerbated by their failure to appreciate the extent of the production of both sensors and intelligence gathering under further attack to critical logistic failures.

Operational planning for a multi-front offensive of the kind initiated by Russia on 24 February would be challenged for many reasons, not least with inadequate planning and inadequate intelligence, even the best military logistic system will likely fail to fulfil its mission. If this is coupled with a lack of tactical acumen, as was the case with Russia in Ukraine, failure will be compounded.

FAILURES IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION

The Russian armed forces' logistic failure reflects gaps in its overall planning and execution of the campaign in Ukraine. Five observers could fail to be impressed by the pictures that appeared in the media in the early stages of the war of a Russian logistic system

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LARGE-SCALE WAR AND NATO

RUSSIAN WAR IN UKRAINE SERIES NO. 6

Soon after Russia launched its large-scale attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, an increasing number of officials and experts expressed their surprise at the poor performance of the Russian Armed Forces. It seems apparent that despite the long State Armament Plans covering 2013-20 and 2018-27 and the annual strategic exercises, the Russian Armed Forces remain less effective than their capability would suggest on paper. However, this does not mean that the Russian military's performance is poor in itself. The Russian forces have both the

(MARTIN FELDT)

of pace, and sometimes even unprofessional, behaviour by Russian troops that likely has contributed to the high rate of casualties. This has already prompted commentators to challenge the threat posed by the Russian military and suggest that it would not prevail against NATO forces in the case of a direct conflict. And it is key to the focus of this article: Russia under Boris Yeltsin, called the Russian Armed Forces a "Russian military on a path to failure" – severely impacted sanctions will further delay or even prevent Russia from rebuilding its inventory of equipment and ammunition, not least precision-guided munitions. But it is correct to write off the conventional threat posed by the Russian Armed Forces?

UNDERPERFORMING RUSSIAN FORCES

The list of examples of the poor performance of the Russian Armed Forces is lengthy. The Russian Air Force has not gained full control of the Ukrainian airspace. The Russian State of the Ukraine campaign. The limited status of the Russian Air Force in suffering failure rates as high as 50% for some of its air-to-ground guided missiles is likely to affect Ukraine's logistic air support as a major factor limiting their combat capabilities. Russian forces apparently rely on cheap uncrewed commercial drones from China and sometimes mobile phones that enable "leakable" signal intelligence to be transmitted, sent, and stored them. Military equipment, such as reportedly being found often from World War 2, highly dated tanks, and (old) clothes, adding credibility to assessments that Russia lacks a developed and proven system of modernising "reserve forces". Postings on social media have also revealed numerous examples

of NATO deterrence zones. Russia would constitute an existential threat to its neighbours.

NATO deterrence failed. Russia would constitute an existential threat to its neighbours. Several scenarios are possible for Alliance members backing Russia, including the occupation of

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Captain USN (ret) William "Bill" Combes examines the activities and the role of Russia's Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine's naval and coastal defence.

