

TRENDS!

Ukraine's Bomb Squads Have a New Top Dog



The U.S. Army has agreed to provide one of its two robotic dogs to help an American nonprofit clean up mines and other ordnance in Ukraine



Tankers Charging Drones With Lasers - Focus Of New DARPA Program



Exploring the feasibility of tankers using lasers to recharge drones' batteries is the program's goal, but it could have bigger implications.




U.S. plans to sell armed drones to Ukraine in coming days



The Biden administration plans to sell Ukraine four MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones that can be armed with Hellfire missiles for battlefield use against Russia





MUST READ! - UKRAINE-Special

Russia's War in Ukraine Series No. 3 - Russian Military Logistics

RUSSIAN MILITARY LOGISTICS
 RONALD TI
 SERIES NO. 3

The size, scale, and scope of the military failures Russia has suffered during its war in Ukraine have surpassed many Western observers. Russia's military has exhibited multiple systemic deficiencies in its military, which appear to be substantial and to extend across every Russian joint combat function. A leading cause of its operational failures has been the critical deficiencies apparent in Russia's military logistic support. The inadequacy of Russia's military logistic system has consequently been a major factor in its inability to achieve its war aims.

Russia's military logistic system has been a leading cause of its operational failures. The main reasons for this are: 1) the lack of a unified logistic command structure; 2) the lack of a unified logistic doctrine; 3) the lack of a unified logistic training system; 4) the lack of a unified logistic intelligence system; 5) the lack of a unified logistic communication system; 6) the lack of a unified logistic transport system; 7) the lack of a unified logistic medical system; 8) the lack of a unified logistic engineering system; 9) the lack of a unified logistic maintenance system; 10) the lack of a unified logistic supply system.

Failures in planning and execution of the Russian armed forces' logistic failure reflects global deficiencies in its overall planning and execution of the campaign in Ukraine. Five observers could fail to be impressed by the pictures that appeared in the media in the early stages of the war of a Russian logistic system comprising mainly soft-skilled, unarmoured vehicles used for 60 km or more to the north of Kyiv. Several commentators have been attracted to the highly unusual tactical formation, however, whether the reason, these pictures illustrated the overall poor operational planning process that characterized Russian planning efforts. As part of this, the operational planning by inadequate logistics, with multiple sources confirming critical shortages of essential logistic materiel and functions such as food, fuel, and medical support. Photos of abandoned equipment in disrepair under further attack to critical logistic failures.

Russian commanders have also shown an alarming lack of tactical acumen in their neglect of protection for logistics convoys, as evidenced by the "straggler" (soft-skilled, logistic vehicles). This situation appears to have been greatly exacerbated by their failure to appreciate the extent of the prohibition of both convoys and the prohibition of both convoys and the prohibition of both convoys and the prohibition of both convoys.

Operational planning for a multi-point offensive of the kind initiated by Russia on 24 February would be challenging for any military that starts with inadequate planning and inadequate intelligence, even the best military. Logistic systems will likely fail to fulfil its mission. If this is coupled with a lack of tactical acumen, as was the case with Russia in Ukraine, failure will be compounded.

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In this brief Dr Ronald Ti examines Russia's failures in planning and executing logistics operations for its war in Ukraine. In large part, these failures can be attributed to systemic weaknesses.



Russia's War in Ukraine Series No. 4 - Large-Scale War and NATO

LARGE-SCALE WAR AND NATO
 MARTIN HURT
 SERIES NO. 4

Soon after Russia launched its large-scale attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, an increasing number of officials and experts expressed their doubts about the poor performance of the Russian Armed Forces. It seems apparent that despite the long State Armament Plans covering 2013-20 and 2020-27 and the annual strategic exercises, the Russian Armed Forces remain less effective than their capability would suggest on paper. However, this does not mean that the Russian military's performance of great in battles. The Russian forces have both but are seemingly unable to take

of pace, and sometimes even unprofessional, behaviour by Russian troops that likely has contributed to the high rate of casualties.

This has already prompted commentators to overstate the threat posed by the Russian military and suggest that it would not proceed against NATO forces in the case of a direct conflict. And it ignores the forces' reliance on Russia under Boris Yeltsin, called the Russian Armed Forces a "Russian military in a suit on 'tougher' recently imposed sanctions will further delay or even prevent Russia from rebuilding its inventory of equipment and ammunition, not least precision guided munitions. But it cannot be written off the conventional threat posed by the Russian Armed Forces?

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Martin Hurt compares Ukraine's military capabilities with those of some Allies and cautions against making any hasty conclusions about NATO's ability to rapidly reinforce and defend its smaller member states in a potential war.

